The Norwegian Ministry of Defense (Forsvarsdepartementet Citation2019a, 19) describes it in the following way: The responsibility for network intelligence operations and offensive cyberoperations are with the Intelligence Service. 230 0 obj
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The specifics of leader development will be shaped by community leaders to be consistent with this Framework, but the fundamental concepts discussed in this Framework apply to the entire Navy Team. 111th Congress (2009-2010), Senate Bill 3480 (S.3480). Cyber Defence Cyberspace is understood as the fifth domain of warfare equally critical to military operations as land, sea, air, and space. (POSTED: April 20, 2022) Submitted per Section 231 of Title 10, United States Code, this report is the Department of the Navys (DoN) 30-year shipbuilding plan for FY2023 through FY2052. There is hence a need for increased attention and a focused approach to how the country-specific organizational model allows for operational capacity to travel from, translate into, and shape intelligence and military entities and to which implications. European Parliament, Scientific Foresight Unit (STOA), PE 603.175, May 2017. On January 27, 2017, President Donald Trump directed Secretary of Defense James Mattis to initiate a new Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). While future research could examine these and other explanatory factors, it is paramount that researchers and policy makers devote greater attention to the organizing of cyber capabilities, including the operational and strategic implications of the organizational divergence across NATO and EU members. xEAj0o@(e4%PJuUcc[6uKosX8groQWdP %0jIR~6y:YdGY mH(6cZb||aXOUc\wq H-r)G.K=[> This calls for cooperation and coordination across military and intelligence entities. These elements hold the promise to decrease the risks that operational capability and activity are mismatched with broader strategic or governance goals, that the military and intelligence entities operate with different purposes and goals, and that political decision-making is hampered, and democratic oversight is disadvantaged. This broad perception of offensive capabilities is deliberately chosen to allow for the empirics to speak rather than an overly restrictive pregiven conceptualization. The doctrine calls for increased coordination and collaboration between the Cyber Command and the intelligence services. This article refers to offensive cyber capabilities as custom-made combinations of human and non-human elements that allow cyber operations to achieve impact across the spectrum of intelligence and attack. The Ministry states that the ability to carry out offensive cyber operations depends on a very good understanding of the target. It also shows that the three countries seem to converge on the fact that both the countering of cyber conflict short of war and the development of military cyber capabilities are dependent on the skills, information, and infrastructure of intelligence services. 3D printing is revolutionizing defence by printing small components to full drones on naval vessels, replacement parts for fighter aircrafts to printing ammunition. The Netherlands presented a military cyber doctrine in 2019. Belgium, Mon - Thu: 10:00 - 17:00 Norway has kept with this model in order to foster synergies and reduce the costs of developing and deploying cyber capabilities. In this document, we outline how our Navy will develop leaders who demonstrate operational excellence, strong character, and resilience through community at every level of seniority. The Alliance needs to be prepared to defend its networks and operations against the growing sophistication of the cyber threats it faces. QDR seeks to adapt, reshape, and rebalance our military to prepare for the strategic challenges and opportunities we face in the years ahead. Drawing out key organizational differences and ambiguities, the analysis identified three models of organizing military and intelligence relations: A Dutch collaboration model, a French separation model, and a Norwegian centralization model. The President made clear that his first priority is to protect the United States, allies, and partners. /Filter /FlateDecode Controlling almost half of the gasoline, jet fuel and diesel flowing along the East Coast of the US turn off the spigot (David and Perlroth Citation2021). /Author (U.S. Fleet Cyber Command,U.S. Instead, its operations are based on a specific intelligence services legislation.Footnote9 The legal framework does allow MIVD to conduct counter-operations. It distinguishes itself by not having a dedicated cyber command. It stresses that the difference between the conduct of cyber operations in war and for espionage relates to the purpose and the desired effect and underlines that those cyber capabilities are complementary and non-competing (Defence Cyber Command Citation2019, 1415). Depending on how this is done and interpreted, it can qualify as an offensive cyber operation. To learn about our use of cookies and how you can manage your cookie settings, please see our Cookie Policy. /Count 3 By closing this message, you are consenting to our use of cookies. The observed divergence in organizing cyber capabilities is likely to be explained by multiple factors, including strategic posture, military culture, economic and human resources, and political will and attention. Yet, the scholarly and political debate about the organization of cyber capabilities has been dominated by U.S. voices and U.S. issues (Devanny and Stevens Citation2021). The United States Army War College educates and develops lead ers for service Yet, the review does not elaborate on when, how, or in collaboration with whom. This strategy is intended to position the United States to respond effectively to challenges and emerging opportunities arising from significant increases in Arctic activity due to the diminishment of sea ice and the emergence of a new Arctic environment. Defense AT&L: November-December 2017 34 change also is needed for the Services to develop and execute an effective and efficient cybersecurity strategy. According to Stphane Taillat (Citation2019), a significant part of offensive cyber operations is the responsibility of the DGSE and lies outside of the French military cyber strategy. In parallel, the EU Directive on the security of network and information systems (NIS Directive) forces member states to adopt legal measures to boost the overall level of their cybersecurity by May 2018. Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Wales on 5 September 2014. /XObject << mt_ C)WvL
The DON's Information Superiority Vision outlines the Secretary's vision to modernize so that the right information can be delivered to the right Sailor or Marine at the right time to defeat high-paced and evolving threats. The sinew of maneuver across all domains is the network. Second, there is much ambiguity related to attribution, intention, and effect of cyber operations (Buchanan Citation2016). Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels 11-12 July 2018. However, the Ministry does not elaborate on how the coordination between the intelligence service and the operational headquarters plays out or what it exactly entails. /CreationDate (D:20150518000000-07'00') The Naval Research and Development Framework outlines processes for speeding new technologies from basic research into finished products, and into Sailor or Marine hands. This creates risks that operational capability and activity may be mismatched with broader strategic or governance goals, that the military and intelligence entities operate with different purposes and goals, that political decision-making is hampered, and that democratic oversight is hindered. For the JSCU it is shared with the corresponding official of the Ministry of Justice and Security. The final section concludes and offers recommendations for future academic and policy debate and design. Council of the European Union (19 June 2017), Council of the European Union (7 June 2017), European Commission - Fact sheet (6 July 2016), Council conclusions on cyber diplomacy (11 February 2015), Council of the European Union (1718 November 2014), European Commission - High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (7 February 2013), European Union - European External Action Service (7 February 2013). The release of this strategic plan marks the five-year anniversary of Navy Fleet Cyber Command/TENTH Fleet. Cybersecurity has the attention of senior DoD officials and the Service chiefs. An official website of the United States government, Department of the Navy Cyberspace Superiority Vision, Climate Action 2030 Department of the Navy, VA Vet Center (Supports vets, service members, and their families), Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year 2023, One Navy-Marine Corps Team: Strategic Guidance from the Secretary of the Navy, eport to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year 2022, After compiling and analyzing feedback from hundreds of Sailors through focus groups and surveys, Task Force One Navyin early 2021 submitted its final report, Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels, Prepared by: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, SECNAV Stem to Stern Comprehensive Review, Comprehensive Review of the DON Uniformed Legal Communities, Department of the Navy Strategic Guidance FY 2020, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, Department of the Navy's New Education Initiatives, A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority (Version 2.0), Navy Leader Development Framework (Version 3.0), Readiness Reform Oversight Committee: One Year Later, Naval Research and Development: A Framework for Accelerating to the Navy and Marine Corps after Next, Naval Research Enterprise (NRE) Addendum to the Naval Research and Development Framework, US Fleet Cyber Command/ Tenth Fleet Strategic Plan 2015-2020, New Navy Cryptologic & Cyber Warfare Community Vision Released, SECNAV Cybersecurity Readiness Review Letter, Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal 2020, Laying the Keel: Developing the Backbone of Our Navy, REMARKS - Acting SECNAV at JFK Christening, REMARKS - Acting SECNAV at Navy Hampton Roads Chamber of Commerce, The President's Coronavirus Guidelines for America, US Navy Hospital Ship Leadership Biographies, Frequently asked questions about USNS Mercy, Frequently asked questions about USNS Comfort deployment to New York City, Hosted by Defense Media Activity - WEB.mil. endstream
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The academic literature has paid scarce attention to how European countries organize cyber capabilities at the intersection of military cyber commands and intelligence services. Fourth, this is par-ticularly true for the harmonisation of crimi - nal law in the fight against cybercrime. 3523 - Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act, President Ilves at Harvard University: all members of NATO must share a common understanding of cyber security, Congressional Testimony: U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Securing Americas Future: The Cybersecurity Act of 2012., International Cyber Diplomacy: Promoting Openness, Security and Prosperity in a Networked World, International Strategy for Cyberspace : Prosperity, Security, and Openness in a Networked World, Protecting Cyberspace as a National Asset Act of 2010, Cyberspace Policy Review : Assuring a Trusted and Resilient Information and Communications Infrastructure, The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace. The Norwegian organization of cyber capabilities is founded on a centralized model that dissolves the organizational distinction between military and intelligence entities. NATO will continue to adapt to the evolving cyber threat landscape. B-1110 Brussels The Convention is the first international treaty on crimes committed via the Internet and other computer networks, dealing particularly with infringements of copyright, computer-related fraud, child pornography and violations of network security. Second, neither consistency in organizational collaboration, separation, nor centralization will automatically translate into efficient operational cyber capabilities to be deployed in intelligence contest, strategic competition, or military confrontation. In the face of a rapidly evolving cyber threat landscape, strong partnerships play a key role in effectively addressing cyber challenges. It is achieved through communication intelligence and interaction with several other intelligence capabilities (Forsvarsdepartementet Citation2019b). It is not publicly disclosed how the human and technical infrastructure resources are pooled in the event of a cyber-attack on the Netherlands surmounting to armed conflict. 3. This article provides a first step in closing that gap by offering a dedicated perspective on the organization of offensive cyber capabilities across three European countries. , Like many companies and organizations across the world, the Navy is facing threats from both individual "lone-wolf kind of actors" and attacks from nation-states, said Vice Adm . TheNavy Aviation Vision 2030-2035reflects key concepts to meet CNOs vision of a Navy that swarms the sea, delivering synchronized lethal and non-lethal efforts from near and far, on every axis and in every domain. This would, inter alia, lead to the creation of a duplication of capabilities, resulting in an unclear distinction between offensive cyber operations inside and outside military operations. Intelligence in the Cyber Era: evolution or Revolution? The signing of this arrangement is the latest example of long-standing cooperation on cyber defence between NATO and Finland. This underlines the importance of intelligence. << SECNAV Stem to Stern Comprehensive Review aims to find $40 billion in savings across the FY 2022-2026 Future Years Defense Program. Speech by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the Cyber Defence Pledge Conference (Ecole militaire, Paris) (15 May 2018) Cyber Defence Pledge. This Arctic Strategic Outlook describes the United States Navy's strategic approach to protect U.S. national interests and promote stability in the Arctic. DON strategy to treat innovation beyond just about buying a new platform or weapon system; by changing the way we think, challenging outdated assumptions, and removing bureaucratic processes that prevent great ideas from becoming reality. Finland is actively engaged with NATO on a number of cyber defence activities, including participation in NATOs annual flagship cyber defence exercise Cyber Coalition, as well as NATOs Crisis Management Exercise. The primary tasks of the unit are the collection of signal intelligence and the delivery of intelligence through cyber operations. This document, signed by Secretary of Defense Mark Esper and all three military service secretaries, outlines the Department of Defense's commitment to residents of military housing and their rights as tenants. B-1110 Brussels The United States is an Arctic nation1 through the state of Alaska and its surrounding territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone waters located in and around the Arctic Circle. This paper presents a brief survey of artificial intelligence applications in cyber defense (CD), and analyzes the prospects of enhancing the cyber defense capabilities by means of increasing the . It increases design possibilities, enhances the speed of innovation, and offers an alternative for creating shapes closer to what an engineer might need, with fewer constraints. Belgium, Mon - Thu: 10:00 - 17:00 Japan, Australia, Canada, and the U.K. are . Report is in response to your request to conduct an independent Cybersecurity Readiness Review following the loss of significant amounts of Department of the Navy data. The arrangement will allow NATO and Finland to better protect and improve the resilience of their networks. The attack meant that Russian intelligence had potential access to as many as 18,000 SolarWinds customers. . (POSTED: October 19, 2022) The Cyberspace Superiority Vision charts the Department of the Navys (DON) pursuit of cyberspace superiority guided by three principles: Secure, Survive, and Strike. /Im2 57 0 R Third, the proposed measures for increased cyber-security lack legal force. This applies to coping with the challenges of persistent cyber conflict short of war as well as the application of cyber operations in armed conflict. The intelligence chain of the strategic review stresses the possibility for the implementation of offensive cyber capabilities (Secrtariat gnral de la dfense et de la scurit nationale Citation2018, 56). objective to transition to commander-driven operational risk assessments for cybersecurity readiness. Attached are the findings of that review along with specific recommendations for your consideration as you determine the way ahead for the nation's Navy. /CropBox [0.0 0.0 612.0 792.0] % We formally analyse security gains and return on investment ratio of DHR in single-node model and defense-chain model scenarios, respectively, and show the relationships between the main parameters of DHR . >> Conceptions, Causes and Assessment, A Matter of Time: on the Transitory Nature of Cyberweapons, Integrating Offensive Cyber Capabilities: meaning, Dilemmas, and Assessment, Cyber Arms Transfer: Meaning, Limits, and Implications, Securing Cyberspace: How States Design Governance Arrangements. Sec. Modly outlines the strategy for how the Department of the Navy will achieve the goals set forth in Education for Seapower. Photo: Navy. Along the same line, the Ministry of Defense emphasizes, in its Defence Vision 2035: Fighting for a safer future, the need for organizational decompartmentalization when countering hybrid threats in the information environment (Ministry of Defense Citation2020, 17) and promises to devote attention to the hybrid strategic competition between war and peace (Ministry of Defense Citation2020, 23).
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